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_____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
After the multinational telecommunications firm Nortel 
Networks declared bankruptcy in 2009, various debtors 
comprising the Nortel brand auctioned their business lines 
and intellectual property. They raised $7.5 billion. Since the 
auctions, the selling debtors have disputed whether or not 
they had previously agreed to allocate the auction funds 
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through arbitration. As it stands, the debtors have $7.5 billion 
and no agreed-upon method for dividing it. 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
determined that the parties did not agree to arbitrate their 
disputes about allocation. Because the contract at the center 
of this controversy does not reflect the parties’ intent to 
arbitrate disputes about the auction funds, we will not compel 
the parties to do so. We therefore affirm. 
We do not consider the Joint Administrators’ related, but 
distinct, challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to 
allocate the contested funds. A panel of this Court declined to 
certify that question for appeal. In any event, the Bankruptcy 
Court has not yet held the hearing to allocate the funds, so 
review would be premature.  
I. Background of the Case 
A. The Facts 
In early 2009, Nortel entities around the world declared 
bankruptcy and filed petitions in U.S., Canadian, English, and 
French courts to begin insolvency proceedings. See In re 
Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(summarizing history of the Nortel bankruptcy). The 
following day, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware and the Superior Court of Ontario, Canada, each 
approved a cross-border protocol for coordinating U.S. and 
Canadian proceedings.  
As a transnational company with numerous subsidiaries 
located in multiple jurisdictions, Nortel’s insolvency posed 
challenges of coordination and timing. Among them, multiple 
Nortel entities owned the business lines and intellectual 
property that comprised the global Nortel brand. Thus, any 
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plan to sell or reorganize Nortel property would have to 
accommodate multiple, and possibly conflicting, interests. At 
the same time, the value of Nortel’s business and intellectual 
property stood to diminish over time. Therefore, any plan to 
sell or reorganize Nortel’s assets had to be formed quickly in 
order to maximize Nortel’s value. The debtors faced a 
conflict between their mutual interest in quick sales and their 
individualized interests in receiving a big share of each sale.   
Enter the Interim Funding and Settlement Agreement 
(“Interim Funding Agreement”). Broadly speaking, the 
Interim Funding Agreement “provides for the parties’ 
cooperation in the global sales of Nortel’s business units and 
agreement that the proceeds of any sale will be held in escrow 
until the parties either reach a consensual allocation or obtain 
a binding procedure for the allocation pursuant to an agreed 
upon protocol.”  Nortel, 669 F.3d at 131. The agreement thus 
created a framework for Nortel debtors to sell assets without 
first agreeing how to allocate the proceeds of any sale among 
the relevant debtors. 
Nortel debtors from the United States, Canada, Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa entered into the Interim Funding 
Agreement on June 9, 2009. The debtors reduced the crux of 
their sales arrangement to Section 12 of the agreement, 
captioned “Entry into Sale Transactions.” That section 
outlines a sale and escrow framework: 
 Section 12(a) states that sales and auctions “shall not be 
conditioned upon” an agreement between the sellers to 
allocate sale proceeds or an agreement on the procedure 
for allocating sale proceeds. App’x 1560, ¶ 12(a).  
 Section 12(b) states that the sale proceeds shall be 
deposited into escrow and not released “in advance of 
either (i) agreement of all of the Selling Debtors or (ii) in 
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the case where the Selling Debtors fail to reach 
agreement, determination by the relevant dispute 
resolver(s) under the terms of the Protocol (as defined 
below) applicable to the Sale Proceeds, and subject in 
each case to payment of the agreed or determined amount 
of allocation of Sale Proceeds to all Selling Debtors.” 
App’x 1560,  ¶ 12(b). 
 Section 12(c) states that the parties shall “negotiate in 
good faith and attempt to reach agreement on a timely 
basis on a protocol for resolving disputes concerning the 
allocation of Sale Proceeds.” App’x 1560, ¶ 12(c). 
 Section 12(d) states that, after a sale, the parties shall 
“negotiate in good faith and on a timely basis to attempt to 
reach agreement regarding the allocation of the Sale 
Proceeds . . . , failing which the Interim Sales Protocol 
shall apply to determine the allocation of the relevant Sale 
Proceeds.” App’x 1560, ¶ 12(d). 
Section 12 does not use the words “arbitrators” or 
“arbitration,” or identify any arbitral association. 
Separate from Section 12, the Interim Funding Agreement 
contains choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses. The 
parties placed these clauses in Section 16, captioned 
“Governing Law and Jurisdiction.” App’x 1563-64. Section 
16(a) specifies that the laws of the State of New York govern 
the agreement except as to Section 17, which concerns the 
personal liability of the representatives of the European, 
Middle Eastern, and African debtors. Section 16(b) states that 
the parties agree “to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the US 
and Canadian Courts (in a joint hearing conducted under the 
Cross-Border Protocol adopted by such Court, as it may be in 
effect from time to time), for purposes of all legal 
proceedings to the extent relating to the matters agreed” in the 
7 
 
Interim Funding Agreement. App’x 1564, ¶ 16(b). No part of 
Section 16 discusses arbitrators, arbitration, or arbitral 
associations.  
The Bankruptcy Court and the Ontario Superior Court 
held a cross-border hearing on the Interim Funding 
Agreement on June 29, 2009. Both courts approved the 
agreement. For its part, the Bankruptcy Court “authorized” 
the U.S. debtors to “enter into the Interim Funding Agreement 
pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9019.” App’x 358, ¶ 2. In its order, the 
Bankruptcy Court also stated that nothing in the order “shall 
constitute a Protocol for determining the allocation of 
proceeds” and that “no proceeds from a Sale Transaction may 
be allocated . . . unless such allocation is in accordance with a 
Protocol approved by this Court.” App’x 359, ¶ 8. Neither the 
Bankruptcy Court’s nor the Superior Court’s order referenced 
arbitration, arbitrators, or arbitral associations.  
After the courts approved the Interim Funding Agreement, 
Nortel debtors held nine auctions. The auctions raised 
approximately $7.5 billion in proceeds. As agreed, the debtors 
placed those proceeds into escrow.  
During and after the auctions, the debtors attempted to 
breathe life into the “Protocol” anticipated by the Interim 
Funding Agreement. Apparently the parties made substantial 
progress toward a protocol—even drafting a procedure for a 
three-person arbitral panel to resolve disputes over proceeds. 
But despite numerous meetings and multiple rounds of 
mediation, the parties never executed that draft or any other.  
B. The Bankruptcy Proceedings 
The failure of the parties to negotiate a protocol left the 
effort to disburse the escrow funds at a standstill. So the 
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parties took the matter to the courts. The U.S. Nortel debtors 
(“U.S. debtors”) and the U.S. Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Nortel Networks Inc. (“U.S. 
creditors”) moved the Bankruptcy Court to decide disputes 
about asset allocation. The Joint Administrators for the Nortel 
debtors in the UK proceedings (“Joint Administrators”) then 
cross-moved to compel arbitration on behalf of Nortel debtors 
located in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The U.S. 
debtors and U.S. creditors (collectively, “U.S. parties”) 
replied that the Interim Funding Agreement—the basis of the 
Joint Administrators’ cross-motion—did not contain an 
agreement to arbitrate. 
In response to these filings, the Bankruptcy Court ruled 
that “the parties agreed that the Courts will make the 
allocation determination rather than an arbitrator or 
arbitrators.” App’x 8. A few weeks earlier, the Superior Court 
reached the same result in the Canadian proceeding; it, too, 
denied a parallel motion to compel arbitration. (The Court of 
Appeal for Ontario has since denied leave to appeal that 
decision, stating that “there is no ambiguity” in the contract 
and “no suggestion . . . that the parties must submit the 
allocation issue to arbitration.” Supplemental App’x 55, ¶¶ 7-
8.) The Bankruptcy Court then approved a cross-border 
judicial allocation protocol. 
The Joint Administrators sought leave to appeal the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order regarding arbitration. Thereafter, 
the Bankruptcy Court certified a direct appeal from its order 
regarding arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B). 
This Court granted the petition to certify appeal of the 
arbitration issue on June 13, 2013. See In re Nortel Networks 
Inc., No. 13-8049 (3d Cir. June 13, 2013). 
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The Joint Administrators separately moved the 
Bankruptcy Court for leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order approving the cross-border judicial allocation protocol. 
The Bankruptcy Court denied the Joint Administrators’ 
request to certify the allocation issue for interlocutory appeal. 
This Court then denied the Joint Administrators’ petition to 
review the cross-border hearing dispute. See In re Nortel 
Networks Inc., No. 13-8055 (3d Cir. June 13, 2013). The Joint 
Administrators applied to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Delaware pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) and 28 
U.S.C. § 158(a). The District Court denied the Joint 
Administrators’ request for leave to appeal the cross-border 
issue.  
II. The Bankruptcy Court Correctly Denied the Cross-
Motion to Compel Arbitration.  
This contract dispute begins and ends with the text of the 
Interim Funding Agreement. The language used by the parties 
in their agreement does not reveal an intent to arbitrate 
disputes about the allocation of the auction funds. Rather, the 
parties used language that indicated they would negotiate the 
procedure by which to divide the funds. Reasoning that the 
arbitration of disputes arising out of bankruptcy proceedings 
requires contractual consent—not the possibility of consent—
the Bankruptcy Court denied the Joint Administrators’ cross-






Arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Volt 
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). “[A] party may not be compelled 
under the [Federal Arbitration Act] to submit to . . . 
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 
that the party agreed to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) 
(discussing class arbitration). To determine whether the 
parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, we employ state 
principles of contract law. See Century Indem. Co. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 532 (3d Cir. 
2009). New York law governs the relevant parts of the 
Interim Funding Agreement. Thus, the agreement must be 
interpreted and enforced according to its plain meaning. See 
Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 
(N.Y. 2002).  
                                              
1
 This Court has jurisdiction over the certified appeal of 
the order denying arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2)(B) and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). We review a 
bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law under a de novo 
standard and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard. In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Because the Bankruptcy Court concluded as a matter of law 
that the Interim Funding Agreement did not contain an 
ambiguity and did not mandate arbitration, we exercise 
plenary review of the Bankruptcy Court’s order. See Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2009).     
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B. The Interim Funding Agreement 
Two features of Section 12 of the Interim Funding 
Agreement lie beyond dispute. The first is that Section 12(a) 
divorces the sale of Nortel’s assets from an agreement 
between the sellers on how to divide the sale proceeds. 
Section 12(a) achieves this by stating that the debtors “shall 
not” condition their agreement to a particular sale on first 
agreeing to asset allocation. See App’x 1560. 
The second undisputed feature of Section 12 is that it does 
not include a protocol for resolving disputes concerning the 
allocation of sale proceeds. Section 12(c) spells this out: the 
parties agree to “negotiate in good faith and attempt to reach 
agreement . . . on a protocol for resolving disputes concerning 
the allocation of Sale Proceeds.” App’x 1560. The presence 
of an agreement to “negotiate” a protocol signals the absence 
of an agreement on that protocol.  
The agreement to a sales framework in Section 12(a) and 
the agreement to negotiate an allocation protocol in Section 
12(c) provide baselines for interpreting Section 12(b). The 
parties could have agreed to allocate the escrowed funds 
through arbitration. Or the parties could have agreed to 
negotiate the mechanism they would use to divide the 
escrowed funds without limiting themselves to arbitration. 
They could not have done both. 
The text of the Interim Funding Agreement supports the 
second interpretation but not the first. Section 12—“Entry 
into Sale Transactions”—does not hint that the parties bound 
themselves to arbitrate. Considered as a whole, Section 12 
creates escrow accounts; it does not disburse them. In fact, 
Section 12 does not mention arbitrators, arbitration, or arbitral 
associations. Of course, parties may agree to arbitration 
without using the word “arbitration.” See, e.g., Chris 
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O’Connell, Inc. v. Beacon Looms, Inc., 652 N.Y.S.2d 24, 25 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“mediate” meant “arbitrate”); Penn 
Cent. Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 441 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (“appraisal” consistent with 
“arbitration”). But the absence of common signal words does 
not demonstrate that the parties agreed to take their disputes 
to a third party. It means the parties did not agree to 
arbitration in customary terms.  
The parties did not agree to arbitrate in other words, 
either. The Joint Administrators disagree, arguing that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate by using the words “dispute 
resolver(s)” in Section 12(b) of the Interim Funding 
Agreement. The Court gives the words “dispute resolver(s)” 
their plain meaning. See Greenfield, 780 N.E.2d at 170. The 
noun “dispute” means “[t]he act of disputing or arguing 
against; active verbal contention, controversy, debate.” 
Dispute, Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/55213 (accessed Nov. 15, 
2013). The noun “resolver” means “[a] person who or thing 
which answers a question, solves a doubt or difficulty, effects 
a resolution of a conflict or dispute, etc.” Resolver, Oxford 
English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163739 
(accessed Nov. 15, 2013). Thus, the plain meaning of 
“dispute resolver(s)” encompasses those persons or things 
that settle controversies. This includes arbitrators, as the Joint 
Administrators argue. But the words do not exclude courts. 
Indeed, as both parties acknowledge, courts have referred to 
themselves as dispute resolvers. See, e.g., Lewis v. Sullivan, 
279 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Federal courts are 
subsidized dispute-resolvers . . . .”). Therefore, the use of the 
words “dispute resolver(s)” does not, standing alone, show 
that the Nortel entities intended to arbitrate their disputes. The 
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words suggest a flexible concept that would permit, for 
example, arbitrators, courts, or mediators.  
The context confirms that Section 12 does not imbue the 
words “dispute resolver(s)” with a narrower meaning than the 
words suggest for themselves. Recall that Section 12(b) 
forbids the release of escrowed funds in advance of either the 
parties’ agreement or the determination of the “relevant 
dispute resolver(s) under the terms of the Protocol.” App’x 
1560. As defined by Section 12(c), the “Protocol” is “a 
protocol for resolving disputes concerning the allocation of 
Sale Proceeds . . . , which Protocol shall provide binding 
procedures for the allocation of Sales Proceeds.” App’x 1560. 
Section 12(c) thus makes it possible to have a different 
“relevant dispute resolver” for different disputes, depending 
on the Protocol, or multiple dispute resolvers for one 
controversy and a single dispute resolver for another. The 
parties matched the breadth of the words “dispute resolver(s)” 
with an equally broad framework for negotiating a Protocol to 
determine how, and by whom, the parties would resolve 
allocation controversies. Nothing in the Interim Funding 
Agreement indicates that the “relevant dispute resolver[] 
under the terms of the Protocol” could not be a court. 
Nonetheless, the Joint Administrators suggest that by 
contemplating a negotiated protocol, the parties revealed their 
intent to handle disagreements in a private forum. After all, 
the Joint Administrators reason, litigants must take a court’s 
rules of procedure as they find them. This reasoning fails 
twice. First, the Joint Administrators ascribe too much 
rigidity to court procedures. Bankruptcy courts confront fluid 
legal and business problems. Consequently, bankruptcy 
courts must work with the parties before them to apply the 
bankruptcy framework to the demands and idiosyncrasies of 
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each case. The Bankruptcy Court and the parties did just that 
when, for example, they collaborated on a cross-border 
protocol. Second, the Joint Administrators’ interpretation 
presupposes the “dispute resolver” will implement the 
Protocol. But, as written, the Interim Funding Agreement 
contemplates the Protocol will identify the “relevant dispute 
resolver(s)” for a given controversy. Negotiating a protocol 
therefore encompasses negotiations over dispute resolvers. By 
agreeing to negotiate which disputes would be settled by 
which dispute resolver (or resolvers), the parties did not 
thereby restrict themselves to settling all disputes by the same 
method, or agree that the method would be arbitration.  
Because we conclude that the agreement contains no 
promise to arbitrate, our analysis ends at the text. “As a 
general rule, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter or add 
a provision to a written agreement.” Schron v. Troutman 
Sanders LLP, 986 N.E.2d 430, 433 (N.Y. 2013). New York 
law permits resort to extrinsic evidence, such as negotiating 
history, when an agreement contains an ambiguity. See Brad 
H. v. City of New York, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2011). But 
the disputed portions of the Interim Funding Agreement were 
not “written so imperfectly that [they are] susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation.” See id. Therefore, no 
legal ambiguity exists. Indeed, we reject as unreasonable the 
Joint Administrators’ view that the Interim Funding 
Agreement could be read to exclude the possibility of court 
intervention. As demonstrated above, that reading finds no 
support in the parties’ agreement.    
Although we do not look to extrinsic evidence to interpret 
the Interim Funding Agreement, we do note that the use of 
extrinsic evidence presents a special interpretative challenge 
for court-approved agreements. Consider Rule 9019(a) of the 
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Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which empowers a 
bankruptcy judge to “approve a compromise or settlement,” 
and Bankruptcy Rule 9019(c), which empowers a bankruptcy 
judge to “authorize” the parties to settle a controversy through 
“final and binding arbitration.” If the parties’ agreements 
could be discerned only by consulting extrinsic evidence, then 
a bankruptcy court might unknowingly use its Rule 9019 
power to “approve” or “authorize” a contract with hidden 
promises. The Joint Administrators argue for just such a 
result by suggesting that the Bankruptcy Judge authorized 
arbitration when it approved the Interim Funding Agreement. 
But how could a judge “authorize” arbitration within the 
meaning of Rule 9019(c) if he or she did not recognize the 
parties had agreed to arbitrate? And how could creditors 
lodge their objections to arbitration if the agreement to 
arbitrate did not plainly appear on the face of the contract? 
These difficult questions underscore the usefulness of 
reducing agreements to arbitrate to plain language that can be 
recognized and enforced by courts examining only the text of 
the agreement. Parties wishing to arbitrate should not hide 
their intent to do so in the shadows of the text. 
III. The Court Declines to Review the Bankruptcy 
Court’s Order to Proceed to Joint Hearing. 
Separate from the contractual dispute, the Joint 
Administrators challenge the Bankruptcy Court’s order to 
proceed with a joint hearing to determine allocation. A panel 
of this Court denied the Joint Administrators’ petition to 
certify this issue for appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d)(2). See In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 13-8055 (3d 
Cir. June 13, 2013) (order denying cross-petition for 
permission to appeal). The District Court denied the Joint 
Administrators’ separate motion for leave to take 
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interlocutory appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s order. In re 
Nortel Networks Inc., No. 13 Civ. 757, Doc. 31 (D. Del. July 
22, 2013) (Order Denying Motion for Leave to Appeal). 
Notwithstanding these rulings, the Joint Administrators invite 
us to consider the propriety of a joint hearing because the 
Bankruptcy Court decided to allocate the escrowed funds in 
the same order that it denied the motion to compel the 
arbitration of fund allocation. 
We decline the invitation. Although this Court has 
jurisdiction over the “entire certified order” of the Bankruptcy 
Court, including the aspects of that order relating to a joint 
hearing, see Tristani ex rel. Karnes v. Richman, 652 F.3d 360, 
366 (3d Cir. 2011), the ripe conflict before us concerns 
whether or not the parties agreed to arbitrate. The Joint 
Administrators’ challenge to the joint hearing and its 
procedures would more appropriately follow the hearing, 
when the parties have developed the record and raised their 
procedural objections to the Bankruptcy Court. 
IV. Conclusion 
We affirm the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware’s order denying the Joint Administrators’ cross-
motion to compel arbitration. The Bankruptcy Court correctly 
determined that the plain language of the Interim Funding 
Agreement did not contain an arbitration clause. The Joint 
Administrators’ reliance on the words “dispute resolver(s)” 
does not show otherwise. In context, the words “dispute 
resolver(s)” indicate that the parties allowed themselves 
latitude to select courts or arbitrators or others to adjudicate 
the parties’ disputes. To respect that contractual latitude, we 
reject the idea that the parties must arbitrate disputes over 
asset allocation.  
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The Court declines to reach the merits of the dispute about 
the joint hearing. 
